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Further information on the activities of the league or 
the Gamaliel Foundation may be obtained by phoning 
(312) 641-5747 or (312) 826-2610, or by writing: The 
Gamaliel Foundation, 109 North Dearborn St., Chicago, 
Illinois 60602 
Similar material on the exploitation of ghetto areas 
was printed in "How Real Estate Exploitation Helps 
Produce Ghettos", in The Building Official, June, 1968, 
and in a note in the Spring, 1971 issue a/Yale Law 
Journal. 
The Con tract Bu ye rs League: A View 
from the Inside 
by John R. MacNamara 
John R. MacNamara started working in Lawndale as a 
Jesuit priest, and was one of the founders of the Con-
tract Buyers League and the Gamaliel Foundation. He 
has since resigned from the Jesuits but is continuing to 
work with CBL in an advisory capacity. 
On June I, 1967, 12 college students and two Jesuit 
seminarians moved into two apartments in Lawndale, a 
black ghetto on Chicago's West Side. Their project was 
planned to last only for the summer. It resulted from the 
seminarians' previous part-time work in the area, and the 
students' desire to contribute actively to the solution of 
the human problems which result from two closely 
related forces-poverty and race. No one knew what 
form constructive assistance might take or even whether 
progress was possible. The urgency of the problems, not 
the evidence of solutions, was the driving force. 
There were certain guidelines which the participants 
set out. The first was that there should be no precon-
ceived ideas regarding what needed to be done. The 
participants felt these problems continued to exist be-
cause all too many people would just sit in offices or on 
college campuses and theorize about the ghetto's needs 
or, at the most, move in and impose solutions and pro-
grams on the community. They realized that all action 
must arise from the needs of the particular community 
involved. 
The first phase of the operation, therefore, was to be 
simply a sincere listening period. The workers would hit 
the streets and listen to the people of the neighborhood 
(local leaders, laborers, housewives, young people, etc.) 
in hope of discovering what specific problems faced the 
people as individuals and contributed to their suffering 
as a community. 
In the second phase, once the workers recognized the 
problems, they would not attempt to solve the problems 1
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themselves, but rather would provide services for bring-
ing people together and for gathering information so 
that the residents of the area could participate in 
effecting the needed changes. The workers did not feel 
they had any extraordinary answers. What they did have 
was time and the understanding that a successful 
endeavor would require research into the causes of the 
problems and the cooperation of many people. Con-
sequently they could gather information and bring 
poeple together-something the overworked residents of 
the area did not have time to do. The students and 
seminarians believed that people who had an under-
standing of the causes behind the problems would be 
able to work together and collectively arrive at solutions. 
Their success would be marked at the point at which 
they had eliminated the need for themselves-when the 
machinery for an organized and developing community 
existed, the people of the neighborhood would be left to 
steer it and keep it functioning for themselves. Then the 
students and seminarians would move: on. 
Ghetto Problems: The Inception of the CBL 
The project began with listening. The group pain-
stakingly visited all the families in a 12 block neighbor-
hood to hear first-hand the human problems facing the 
community. They did hear them, plus repeated stories of 
almost inhuman exploitation. They discovered that the 
worst psychological problem of the ghetto was the sense 
of futility and impotence. People admitted over and over 
their despair of ever achieving things they had a right to 
achieve. 
For example, the residents complained that they were 
expected to pay taxes but did not receive the services 
their tax money paid for. There were no playlots as 
there were in other parts of the city, and their children 
were forced to play in the streets or in alleys strewn with 
broken glass and litter. They complained that garbage 
was not collected regularly-yet they were criticized by 
outsiders for being unclean. 
They told of paying high rents to landlords living in 
the suburbs. The study group found that slumlords hire 
real estate managers whose major skill is manipulating 
the tenants. Investigation showed that complaints of 
building code violations were either never filed or were 
dismissed in court on the·basis that the alleged code 
violations did not exist. 
In its preliminary phase the study group focused on 
such issues. Once convinced that all normal channels for 
correcting conditions had been tried and had failed, they 
organized public dramatizations of the conditions. There 
were a few small gains: the garbage collection was im-
mediately resumed and has continued regularly and a 
playlot was constructed. 
These were victories achieved during the first summer. 
The students planned to return to their colleges in 
September, and the disintegration of the project seemed 
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imminent. I felt strongly that what modest but signifi-
cant progress had been made would be wasted if the 
effort were abandoned, and I secured permission to post-
pone my theological studies in order to continue the 
project. Mr. MacNamara has since resigned from the 
Jesuits and is continuing to work with the CBL on his 
own. (-Ed.) Several students worked out academic pro-
grams with their colleges in conjunction with Loyola 
University of Chicago so that they could continue to 
participate. The project had turned a critical corner. 
As it continued to listen, the group discovered that 
one issue had a stronger negative effect on the lives of 
the people and the conditions of the ghetto than any 
other. The issue was exploitation in the sale of real 
estate. This was to become the main rallying point of the 
community and the chief concern of the project. 
The group decided to conduct an extensive research 
project concerning real estate practices in changing 
neighborhoods throughout the city of Chicago. By 
examining title transactions and public documents in the 
County Recorder's office, data were compiled on several 
hundred buildings. The research project revealed a con-
sistent pattern of exploitation. The best way to describe 
the situation is to consider the case of one family in 
detail. 
According to county records and the testimony of a 
real estate speculator and a contract purchaser presented 
before the Public Welfare Committee of the Illinois 
House of Representatives at a public hearing on 
November 15, 1968, Mr. and Mrs. Howell Collins of 
3932 W. Congress Parkway in Lawndale purchased their 
property on contract for $25,500 on September 26, 
1960. The speculator had purchased the same building 
only three days before for $14,000 from a white owner-
occu"pant who was selling because the neighborhood was 
changing from white to black. The contract which Mr. 
and Mrs. Collins signed called for a down payment of 
$1,500 and the balance to be paid over 19 years at a rate 
of 7% interest, the maximum allowed under Illinois law. 
Their monthly installments were $226.00, of which 
$190.00 was applied to principal and interest.* 
To demonstrate the extent of the gouging involved in 
these sales, it will be helpful to draw a few comparisons. 
Under the terms of the contract, Mr. and Mrs. Collins 
will pay a total of $44,820 for their building. Of this, 
$19 ,320 is interest. If they had been able to purchase 
the building for $15 ,000 with the same down payment 
and the same monthly rate, they would have paid a total 
of$ 20,740. Of this, only $5 ,740 would be interest. 
Because of the inflated sales price, these contract pur-
*One might ask whether the departing white families or 
the incoming black families were more the victims of an 
injustice. But the evidence compiled from county 
records, independent appraisers and the word of a real 
estate broker who operated in the area prior to the 
changeover indicates that the $14,000 paid by the specu-
lator approximated the actual value of the building. 
Moreover, a recent appraisal of the Collins building by 
the Federal Housing Administration indicated that its 
present value is $15 ,000. 
chasers were paying interest on a much greater principal. 
They were not only charged an excess $10,500 on the 
sales price, but they also were charged $13,480 in excess 
interest charges. In other words, they were paying a 
"race tax" of $23,980. Moreover, it should be noted 
that they would have made their final payment in 
October 1968 if a mortgage and fair price had been avail-
able. Their contract balance, however, as of December 1, 
1968, was $17,535.12 with a perfect payment record. 
And, because a contract buyer (as opposed to a mortgage 
buyer) does not have equity until his final payment is 
made, a purchaser who defaults loses his home and every 
cent he has paid on the contract. 
The activities in the investment world followed a 
similar pattern. In the Collins case, the records show 
that the speculator paid $2,000 down and obtained a 
mortgage for $12,000. The purchasers in turn made a 
$1,500 down payment to the speculator. Consequently, 
the speculator's actual investment was $500. Most specu-
lators anticipated returns of approximately 30 to 40 per 
cent per annum. In many cases, such as this, the actual 
cash investment of the speculator was minimal or non-
existent. In some cases, speculators obtained mortgages 
for more than they had paid for the building. 
For example, in Englewood on Chicago's South Side 
one speculator did just that-many times over. He sold a 
building valued at approximately $15 ,000 to a black 
buyer for $25,000 with a down payment of $1,400 by 
obtaining a first mortgage from a local savings and loan 
institution in the amount of $13,600 and then by pro-
viding a second mortgage in the amount of $10,000, the 
proceeds of which were pure profit for the speculator. 
In addition to the inflated sale price and high interest 
charged, many buyers across the city were forced to 
make costly repairs after signing the contract. One 
couple was told by the speculator that the building was 
free of code violations. Three weeks after they moved in, 
a man who identified himself as a building inspector 
appeared at their door. They then were required to 
spend another $ 2,500 to correct code violations. 
These events are common to the ghetto dweller. In 
Lawndale more than a half of the buildings are pur-
chased on contract by black buyers. The average addi-
tional charges on buildings purchased since 1959 came 
to $20,000. In one case the additional charges were 
"only" $10,000; in another case, they amount to 
$50,000. Current FHA appraisals bear the same relation-
ship to the price paid by the speculator to the departing 
white family and the price charged to black purchasers 
as in the Collins case. Monthly installments generally 
comprise 35% to 45% of the family's income. The FHA 
considers payments of more than 25% to be excessive. 
Table 1 demonstrates the markup in prices of 
buildings purchased on contract. In every case, the 
building was sold to Negro buyers within a year after it 
was purchased by real estate speculators. In most cases, 
the resale took place within three months. The figures 
listed in the chart do not include repairs required by 
building inspectors after the buyer moved in. 
At first, it seemed that the blame should be placed 
upon the speculators alone. But further research indi-
cated that the speculators were not the sole cause of the 3
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Table I 
Documented Documented Approximate Total 
Price Paid Price Charged Additional Additional 
Building By Speculator Negro Buyers Markup Interest* Charges 
No. I 18,000 27,500 9,500 10,150 19,650 
No. 2 14,000 24,000 10,000 10,550 20,550 
No. 3 16,000. 26,000 10,000 10,720 20,720 
No. 4 16,000 27,500 11,500 11,580 23,080 
No. 5 15,500 25,500 10,000 11,620 21 ,620 
No. 6 13,000 26,000 13,000 12,885 25,885 
No. 7 13,500 23,000 9,500 10,045 19,545 
No. 8 18,000 27,500 9,500 10,150 19,650 
No. 9 15,000 28,000 13,000 13,165 26,165 
No. 10 14,000 22,500 8,500 9,155 17,655 
No. 1 I 8,000 22,000 14,000 13,035 27,035 
No. 12 13,500 22,000 8,500 9,440 17,940 
No. 13 11,000 21,250 10,250 11,255 21,505 
No. 14 13,500 23,000 9,500 10,045 19,545 
No. 15 11,500 24,000 12,500 12,345 24,845 
No. 16 8,000 15,500 7,500 7,440 14,940 
No. 17 16,000 24,500 8,500 9,300 17,800 
No. 18 15,000 24,500 9,500 10,025 19,525 
No. 19 14,500 23,000 8,500 9,220 17,720 
No. 20 13,500 24,500 11,000 11,105 22,105 
*These figures are based on $1,000 down payments and interest rates of 7% to the Negro buyer and 6% if they were on con-
ventional mortgage. 
plight of black homeowners. Many buyers had taken pre-
cautions at the time they were buying. Realizing that 
they were not experts in the field, they had sought legal 
advice and were told by their lawyers that they were 
being treated fairly both as regards sale price and the 
terms of the contract. 
Without overlooking the unethical dealings of the 
speculators or the ineptitude of some of the lawyers, it 
must be said that the problem has deeper roots. The 
blame for this intolerable exploitation of black home 
buyers falls on many elements of our society. 
The FHA 
Of these, the Federal Housing Administration has 
long been one of the chief offenders. In order to under-
stand the role of FHA, it is necessary to examine some 
of FHA 's purposes and policies. In the l 930's, FHA 
made extensive changes in the pattern of home owner-
ship in the United States. Up to that time, banks, savings 
and loan institutions and other mortgage outlets required 
down payments amounting to one-third of the appraised 
value of the buildings. FHA's program was designed to 
provide low-income Americans with the opportunity for 
home ownership by insuring mortgages up to 97% of the 
appraised value of the building. In doing so, however, 
this agency of the federal government promoted racial 
discrimination. Housing, a report of a 1961 study pub-
lished by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, stated: 
"The FHA indeed encouraged racial discrimination. Its 
explanation for doing so was the widespread idea that 
property value of a residential neighborhood suffered 
when the residents were not of the same social econo-
mic and racial group." (p. 16) ' 
The report also quoted the FHA underwriting manual 
of 1938: "If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is 
necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied 
by the same social and racial groups." The report also 
indicated that the manual recommended the use of re-
strictive covenants (stipulation that the property could 
not be sold to Negroes and other groups), that it con-
tained a model of such a covenant and that it almost 
demanded restrictive covenants as a prerequisite for 
obtaining FHA assistance. 
In addition to the racial restrictions on eligibility for 
FHA financing, there also existed an "economic sound-
ness requirement." This requirement restricted loans to 
buildings 'whose remaining economic life was sufficiently 
long to warrant them. These two restrictions made it 
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virtually impossible for black people to obtain loans be-
cause the racial requirement eliminated loans in changing 
neighborhoods and the economic soundness requirement 
eliminated loans in almost all black communities because 
of the age of the buildings. 
Finally, an FHA administrative procedure of "red-
lining" certain areas of the city was another factor which 
denied black home buyers the benefits of a nationwide 
private housing program. This practice isolated certain 
areas of the city as areas in which FHA mortgage in-
surance was not available. It was no coincidence that 
these "red-lined" areas coincided with the black areas. 
Recently FHA has begun to change its policies. The 
requirement of "racial homogeneity" in a neighborhood 
was eliminated several years ago. In July 1967, after 
urban riots in many cities, FHA Commissioner Letter 
No. 63 instructed FHA offices to consider all buildings 
in "riot or riot-threatened areas" as acceptable risks. 
"Red-lining" was discontinued in Chicago several years 
ago. 
Generally, FHA was in business to provide Americans 
with the opportunity of owning a home without large 
down payments. But it is also clear that the benefits of 
this program were available almost exclusively to white 
Americans. Black people who wished to own a home 
were forced to buy on contract at higher prices. Black 
dollars, therefore, were not equal to white dollars. 
Lending Institutions 
A second element in our society which has contri-
buted to the exploitation of blacks in the housing mar-
ket proved to be the lending institutions. Customarily, 
banks and savings and loan institutions write off certain 
areas of the city, often corresponding with the areas in 
which black people are living. Potential black purchasers 
in these areas are refused loans, eveq with substantial 
down payments. Yet, speculators are able to secure 
mortgages in these areas, frequently on lower down pay-
ments than offered by black buyers. 
The lending institutions cite poor credit risks and un-
sound properties as the reasons for their unwillingness to 
make mortgage loans to black people. (Experience 
proves the allegation that black people are poor credit 
risks to be false.) And the soundness argument explodes 
when it is realized that the same buildings which are 
"unsound" economically when a black buyer seeks a 
mortgage suddenly become "sound" when a white 
speculator applies. 
The report of the National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders charged that white society creates the 
ghetto, condones it and maintains it. In looking at the 
policies of FHA and the lending institutions, we can see 
how racism has been institutionalized. This is a concrete 
example of the phenomenon reported by the Kerner 
Commission. 
A final factor which created the conditions for the 
contract buying swindle is widespread racial prejudice. 
The black buyer was forced into a very limited housing 
market, and this limited supply made possible the con-
spiracy to reap excessive profits from black people. The 
vast majority of black contract purchasers did not desire 
homes in areas where they had to face overt prejudice 
and violence from white neighbors. Consequently, when 
they shopped to compare housing prices, they were com-
paring prices only in the controlled markets discussed 
above. 
The grossly inflated cost of contract buying means 
that husbands must work two and sometimes three jobs 
in order to make ends meet. It means that wives must 
work, that family life is all but destroyed and that 
children must be left unsupervised. For many, contract 
buying is the lesser of two evils. Couples faced with the 
choice of continuing to pay exorbitant rents comparable 
to their current monthly installments or buying on con-
traCt choose the latter, hoping someday to own their 
own homes. The criticism by the white community hurts 
even more because the black buyers are only too well 
aware that they cannot afford repairs after putting all 
their money into the pockets of speculators through 
grossly inflated monthly installments. It means, too, that 
they must face embarassment in admitting that they 
entered into bad deals, especially when many of them 
sought out the advice of attorneys when they made their 
purchases. In brief, contract buying means frustration 
and despair. 
Once the research had been completed, the student 
researchers felt that it was necessary to make the results 
available to both the black community and the white 
community. They began by explaining their findings to 
contract purchasers in the community in personal inter-
views in local homes and in public meetings. The re-
searchers started with the black community because 
they felt it would be better if representatives from the 
black community would participate in the communica-
tion of the findings to the white community. As a result 
of the sustained effort in communicating these results to 
the residents of the black community, a rather thorough 
understanding of the findings evolved within a short period. 
Consequently, the residents began to ask what might 
be done about the situation. Ir: February 1968 a group 
of contract purchasers met with the researchers. As a 
result, a small group of exploited black home purchasers 
formed an organization called the Contract Buyers of 
Lawndale. When contract purchasers from other parts of 
the city asked to join, the group expanded to become 
the Contract Buyers League. The organization has ex-
panded to include over 1,000 contract purchasers from 
the West and South Sides of Chicago. 
In keeping with their original guidelines, the seminar-
ians and students decided not to assume a role of leader-
ship in the Contract Buyers League. They decided to 
retain their own identity and to work with the League, 
but to remain distinct, as the Presentation Church Com-
munity Organization Project. In June 1968 they changed 
their name to the Gamaliel Foundation. 
The decision was made not to replace the college stu-
dents who made up most of the Gamaliel Foundation 
staff with more college students because many of the 
contract buyers were more knowledgeable about the 5
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intricacies of contracts than a new contingent of college 
students would possibly be. Therefore, the Gamaliel 
Foundation employed four black contract purchasers in 
the latter months of 1968 and opened a store front 
office on Pulaski Road to provide a headquarters for the 
Contract Buyers League and adequate office space for 
the Gamaliel Foundation. 
In the fall of 1968 another group presented itself to 
the members of the Contract Buyers League and staff 
workers of the Gamaliel Foundation. This group con-
sisted of black contract purchasers who found them-
selves in a position similar to the people who had bought 
used residential property from real estate speculators as 
described above. This new group of contract buyers con-
sisted of purchasers of new homes, principally on the 
Sou th Side of Chicago. They had been overcharged for 
new homes in the same manner as contract buyers had 
been for old homes. For example, one family purchased 
a new home on 95 th Street in April 1967 from a builder 
who sold more than one thousand homes to black 
families-all on contract. The purchase price of this 
single-family dwelling was $29 ,200. An appraisal based 
on standard building costs at the time indicated that the 
fair market value of this property was $22,500 ($6,700 
less than the con tract price). 
If this family had obtained the building at a fair price 
of $22,500 making the same down payment and 
monthly payments at the same interest rate, they would 
have paid for the building in fourteen years and their 
total cash outlay would have been $31,712. They were 
to pay $52 ,650 under the contract. 
In addition to overcharging these contract purchasers, 
the builder refused to allow his purchasers to obtain 
mortgages-even in a case where the purchaser made a 
down payment of$ I 0,000. When asked, the builder told 
prospective buyers that the terms of his contracts were 
better than mortgages. He also insisted that the contract 
buyers use companies which he selected for making 
improvements on their homes and refused to make 
repairs necessitated by faulty construction. Conference 
table negotiations were attempted with the builder of 
these new homes. The result was the builder's adamant 
refusal to consider any renegotiation of contracts. 
The group of new home buyers joined the Con tract 
Buyers League. 
When the Contract Buyers League was first organized, 
the members-together with the members of the group 
which became the Gamaliel Foundation-decided the 
best place to begin would be to consult wit~ lawyers. 
But after presenting the problem to approximately 30 
lawyers, no legal remedies had been suggested. It was 
decided that the members of the Contract Buyers League 
would have to seek renegotiation of the contracts by 
trying to deal with the speculators directly. If ~hat failed, 
they were prepared to apply pressure through demon-
strations. 
In an effort to settle the matter, the Contract Buyers 
League softened its original negotiating p.os~tion re.gard-
ing fair price several times. But the negotia.t1.ons f~1led. 
The League members then decided to v1s1t their 
neighbors and picket the speculators' offices. Care was 
taken to assure that picket lines composed of members 
of the Contract Buyers League, the staff of the Gamaliel 
Foundation and the supporters from the white com-
munity were orderly and conducted within the frame-
work of the law. Fact sheets describing the issues in 
detail and providing appropriate documentation were 
distributed. An atmosphere of cooperation existed be-
tween the members of the Contract Buyers League and 
the Chicago Police Department. The League not'ified the 
police in advance about any demonstration and agreed 
to follow police orders, with any disputed order to be 
submitted later to the Human Relations Section of the 
Police Department. 
On one occasion, the members of the Contract Buyers 
League had decided to picket a speculator in Cicero, 
Illinois. Fearing a disturbance, the members of CBL 
decided to take extra precautions ahead of time. The 
U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois 
assigned a special group of FBI agents to the scene at the 
request of members of the Contract Buyers League. In 
addition, several lawyers volunteered to be cm hand at 
this demonstration in case of police irregularities. Fortu-
nately, the Cicero demonstration was conducted without 
incident. 
Many people told members of the Contract Buyers 
League that demonstration efforts would not be success-
ful. The experience of the Contract Buyers League has 
been that properly executed demonstrations, tightly 
controlled, can be successful. The activity brought all of 
the speculators to the bargaining table and some made 
considerable concessions. Unfortunately, the Contract 
Buyers League was still not able to reach agreement with 
the majority of the speculators. 
In the summer of 1968 the Public Welfare Committee 
of the Illinois General Assembly conducted a public 
hearing. Real estate speculators and representatives of 
the lending institutions were invited to attend this sum-
mer hearing but failed to respond.Consequently, the 
Public Welfare Committee decided to hold another 
hearing in November 1968 and to require the testimony 
of the real estate speculators and representatives of the 
lending institutions. As a result of these hearings, mem-
bers of the legislature and the Chicago Bar Association 
began to provide legal protections for low income and 
unsophisticated home purchasers. In view of the limited 
success during ten months of negotiations and picketing, 
the members of the Contract Buyers League realized 
that more was needed. 
In a press conference held at the Contract Buyers 
League office on November 20, 1968, Charlie Baker, 
CBL chairman, announced plans for the withholding of 
monthly payments. Mr. Baker's press statement included 
the following remarks: 
'Ten months is a long time to walk. Ten months is a 
long time to talk without results. Two hundred twenty 
dollars a month is a lot to pay when you have to work 
two jobs in order to pay it. Our patience is running out. 
"In spite of our discouragement, we intend to remain 
non-violent. Nevertheless, we feel that it is necessary to 
step up our tactics. The only power we have is economic 
power-our monthly payments. Each of us will withhold 
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his payments effective December I, 1968. All of us will 
make out money orders to ourselves each month which 
will be held on deposit. 
"We have considered all aspects of our action. Since 
we have offered our tenants a 25% rent reduction when 
we renegotiate, they are with us and do not in tend to 
pay their rents to the speculators. So if they try to 
collect rents from our tenants, it will not work. If the 
speculators try to take the buildings back, we assure the 
speculators that they will not sell them again to black 
people. We feel sure that white people are not interested 
in buying the buildings, unless they think they can cheat 
black people out of money. We can also assure the specu-
lators that they will never rent these buildings to black 
families. The speculators need not fear that the buildings 
will burn down-we den't want them to collect money 
on the insurance we have paid over the years. 
"We have heard enough about return on the specu-
lators' investments. Until our dollars are equal in value 
to the speculators', this doesn't mean a thing. We are 
tired of walking and talking without results and of all 
the speculators' delaying tactics. The only thing that can 
keep us from going through with the "Holdout" is a 
commitment from a speculator to renegotiate his con-
tracts on CBL terms. " 
The decision of the contract buyers to withhold their 
monthly payments met with extensive approval through-
out the Chicago community. One of the most significant 
endorsements came in a Chicago Sun-Times editorial 
entitled "End Home-Contract Gouge" on November 23, 
1968, three days after the CBL announcement. This 
editorial read, in part, as follows: 
"Although the holders of the contracts probably have 
the letter of the law on their side and could enforce their 
contracts in the courts, we urge them to negotiate. The 
buildings involved were often bought by speculators at 
low prices from white families fleeing changing neighbor-
hoods, then immediately sold at tremendously inflated 
prices. Most of the speculators have already made a 
reasonable profit from these transactions, even though 
their contracts may have years to run. 
"This kind of transaction goes well beyond the 
bounds of good business practice and reasonable return 
on an investment." 
The contract sellers, many now joined together in the 
Real Estate Investors Association, should come to terms 
with the Contract Buyers League. Many individual con-
tract holders have already done so, reaching agreements 
that appear to be eminently sound. 
"Under the letter of the law, the contract holders 
may still be able to collect the full amount of their con-
tracts, or evict 1,000 contract buyers after the first of 
the month. We cannot believe this would be in the best 
interests of the business community or of the Real 
Estate Investors Association, itself. It certainly would 
not be in the best interest of the community at large." 
The withholding of payments began as announced on 
December I, 1968. Members of the Contract Buyers 
League had money orders in the amount of their month-
ly payments made out to themselves and then deposited 
with the Contract Buyers League. In the first month of 
the withholding, 327 families withheld payments 
amounting to $63,000. By the end of the second month, 
595 families had joined the effort. Within three months, 
they had withheld a quarter of a million dollars. 
The members of the Contract Buyers League decided 
at the time of the withholding campaign to submit their 
problem to the judicial process in the hope that justice 
could be achieved through the legal system. They ob-
tained the services of two of the city's outstanding law 
firms-McCoy, Ming and Black and Jenner and Block-on 
a volunteer basis. 
Two lawsuits were filed in the federal district court in 
January 1969 and assigned to Judge Hubert L. Will. The 
first lawsuit was filed on behalf of black contract pur-
chasers of used residential property in Chicago. The 
second lawsuit was filed on behalf of black contract 
purchasers of new construction property in Chicago. The 
latter case was reassigned to Judge J. Sam Perry in the 
spring of 1970. Both lawsuits filed in January 1969 con-
tain the same basic allegations. 
The complaints allege that the defendants-consisting 
of sellers, lenders and others-exploited and furthered 
the custom and usage of residential racial segregation in 
the city of Chicago and charged discriminatory prices to 
black contract purchasers; that, in so doing, they 
violated the provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteen th 
Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, by sub-
jecting the contract purchasers to a form of involuntary 
servitude during the terms of their contracts and by pre-
venting the contract purchasers from having and 
exercising the same right as is enjoyed by white citizens 
to purchase and hold real property. 
Both cases have progressed slowly. But both cases 
have resulted in two significant decisions. In the spring 
of 1969 Judge Will ruled that the cases are to be heard 
as class actions, thereby covering all purchasers who 
bought homes from the named defendants. Shortly 
thereafter, Judge Will denied the defendants' motions to 
dismiss. He further ordered the publication of a notice 
announcing the class action which appeared in The 
Chicago Daily Defender, The Chicago Sun-Times, The 
Chicago Tribune and Chicago Today on Monday, June 
2, 1969. 
Since that time, the long, tedious process of legal dis-
covery has been progressing slowly. In spring of 1970 
Judge Will ruled that a statistically proven random 
sample of 475 of the 3,000 plaintiffs in the used 
property case would be acceptable. This "sample" is 
designed to demonstrate a profile of the activities of the 
defendants. Significant progress has been made in 
gathering the data for the sample and preparing it for 
computerization. In the new property case, the transfer 
to Judge Perry and countless other problems have 
delayed discovery. It is expected that both cases will be 
tried starting in September, 1971. 7
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In an effort to demonstrate their good faith, the 
members of the Contract Buyers League decided to 
resume making the monthly payments to the contract 
sellers in April 1969 when Judge Will indicated that he 
could not enjoin the sellers from instituting and carrying 
out eviction proceedings in the state courts against 
those who were withholding their payments. But within 
a very short period of time a number of difficulties pre-
sented themselves, difficulties which pointed out that 
lawsuits alone were insufficient means for achieving 
justice. 
Once the members of the Contract Buyers League 
had resumed making payments in April 1969 the sellers 
immediately ceased talking about out-of-court settle-
ments and began to engage in a variety of delaying 
tactics in the courts. Many contract purchasers were 
subjected to great pressure because the sellers now de-
manded that previously overlooked delinquencies be 
amortized and threatened to use state court proceedings 
to effect evictions. 
It became clearer and clearer that it would take many 
months, perhaps even years, to resolve the matter in the 
courts. At the outset, Judge Will indicated that the case 
could be tried _in the spring of 1969. Soon it became un-
certain that the case would be disposed of even by the 
end of 1970. Many members of the bar predicted that 
ultimate resolution would require five to ten years. 
A delay of justice can be a denial of justice, for the 
"justice" afforded the CBL is clearly inadequate. Judge 
Will appears to have affirmed the truth of this statement. 
When ruling on the application of the Statute of Limita-
tions in the CBL lawsuits, he wrote as follows: 
"It has been determined that the first count of this com-
pfaint states a claim for violation of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866. Only the most parochial view of the Civil 
Rights Act would identify its ultimate intention to be 
simply the restoration of any monetary loss suffered on 
account of race. The abolition of slavery was to be a 
redemption of human dignity. The indignity alleged to 
have been suffered in this case cannot be confined to the 
dates of execution of the various contracts, but can be 
understood only in relation to the continuing activity 
whereby the alleged indignity continues to be inflicted 
and exploited. " 
Judge Will appears to have recognized that the tender-
ing of each payment is a repetition of the indignity. Yet 
the contract purchasers were expected to make the 
exorbitant monthly payment called for by the contract 
for many months, perhaps even years, until the court's 
ultimate decision. In the event of a favorable final deci-
sion the purchasers would have suffered the indignity 
described by Judge Will with every payment tendered 
during the intervening period. 
Even more important than the indignity is the actual 
hardship suffered. Under the Housing and Urban 
Development Act of 1968, Congress recognized that 
excessive housing payments cause hardship. Consequent-
ly, Congress enacted legislation for subsidy payments to 
make up the difference between 20 per cent of a family's 
income and the required monthly payment under a 
mortgage for principal, interest, taxes, insurance and 
mortgage insurance premiums for certain low income 
families. In other cases, where FHA mortgages are 
available, the monthly payments cannot exceed 25 per 
cent of the family income. Apparently, Congress felt 
that housing allocation in excess of 25 per cent of in-
come makes maintenance of a decent standard of living 
difficult or impossible. 
Table II provides a comparison of income and basic 
living costs for several contract purchasers. The housing 
expenditure includes only the monthly payment called 
for by the contract. It does not include expenses for 
improvements and repairs, which are very high for most 
con tract purchasers. The income figure includes the 
rentals but does not reflect the collection difficulties 
which some contract purchasers are experiencing or 
losses resulting from vacancies. 
The first flaw in the judicial process is delay and the 
hardships that creates. The second flaw in the judicial 
process which concerned the Contract Buyers League 
was the inequality of remedies available to contract 
purchasers as opposed to contract sellers. The contract 
buyers had a remedy consisting only of an expensive, 
long, uphill and uncertain legal battle. The contract 
sellers, on the other hand, had a statutory remedy 
against contract purchasers who did not meet their pay-
ments. It provided for a summary proceeding in which 
the contract buyers were barred from raising any de-
fenses arising out of the nature of the contract. The 
summary proceeding available to the sellers was inex-
pensive, speedy and certain. And the sellers were 
readying themselves to take advantage of this inequality. 
This statutory "remedy" was established by the 
Illinois legislature's Forcible Entry and Detainer Act of 
1826. In an effort to protect the right to possession, the 
legislature, recognizing the importance of the time 
element, saw fit to give to the contract seller an advan-
tage over the contract buyer. The contract seller was 
given an additional statutory remedy, summary in 
nature, which virtually nullified the buyer's common 
law rights. 
The Forcible Entry and Detainer Act was applicable 
only to real estate contracts. It prohibited the contract 
purchaser from raising any defenses and effectively 
denied him the right to trial by jury since the judge 
would direct the verdict in these cases. The reason for 
the existence of such injustice in the law can be ex-
plained only in terms of history. It can never really be 
justified. 
In other contract situations than real estate, such a 
procedure is not permitted. In fact, even if the parties to 
a goods sale had agreed to such a procedure and set it 
out in the terms of the contract, it is possible that a 
court would hold such terms unconscionable and there-
fore unenforceable, as under Uniform Commercial Code, 
~2-302, which is in force in Illinois. That article has 
governed contracts for goods other than real estate for 
many years. It states in part: 
"If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at 
the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the 
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Buyer Dependents Payment 
No. I [widow] 165 
0 
No. 2 [widower] 218 
2 
No. 3 10 189 
No.4 9 172 
No. 5 5 217 
No. 6 0 205 
No. 7 [widow] 200 
0 
No. 8 3 205 
No. 9 I 207 
No. 10 3 216 
No. 11 l 212 
No. 12 6 176 
No. 13 0 213 
No. 14 5 210 
contract or it may enforce the remainder of the contract 
without the unconscionable clause as to avoid any un-
conscionable result." 
But there was no such remedy for the contract buyers of 
real estate. 
Another aspect of the judicial process which con-
cerned the Contract Buyers League was the "ivory 
tower" nature of the process as it dealt with the prob-
lems of black people. Black contract purchasers were 
bringing very human problems before the courts. With-
out questioning or challenging the integrity, sincerity 
and obvious good will of many members of the bench, it 
can fairly be said that the experience of the majority is 
such that they are intimately familiar with the style of 
life and business operations of litigants such as the con-
tract sellers. This is not true with respect to the life style 
of the contract purchasers. This type of experience does 
have an effect upon the manner in which men think. It 
seems to have been operative when Judge Will "set up 
guidelines for the resumption of payments in the Con-
tract Buyers League cases. While he provided that the 
sellers deposit a portion of the payments into a special 
account so that money would be available for rebates if 
called for by the ultimate deicsion, he also insisted that 
all delinquencies be amortized. It cannot be said that 
these guidelines were governed by experience alone, but 
familiarity with the life style of black contract pur-
chasers would have made it difficult not to provide some 
measure of immediate relief for purchasers. What I sug-
gest is not that members of the bench should be passion-
ate advocates but rather that experience does affect 
decisions. 
Percent of Food 
Net Income Cost 
Net Income From Prin- Per 
From Prin- cipal Job Monthly Day 
cipal Job and Rentals Grocery Per 















55% 20 .67 
44% 110 1.22 
32% 60 .17 
35% 200 .61 
44% 160 .75 
42% 50 .83 
46% 64 2.03 
40% 140 .93 
41% 80 .90 
38% 130 .87 
38% 150 1.67 
37% 195 .81 
39% 110 1.84 
44% 160 .75 
Thus, in June 1969 the members of the Contract 
Buyers League were attempting to find immediate solu-
tions for the problems of time and unequal remedies. 
They realized, after discussing the matters with attorneys 
(their own and others), that the solutions did not lie 
within the scope of the lawsuits they had filed. They 
knew they had to find a creative, peaceful and effective 
solution. 
The members of the Contract Buyers League con-
cluded in July 1969 that the only viable alternative was 
some sort of peaceful demonstration. The CBL decided 
that the only effective demonstration would be to begin 
withholding monthly payments again. 
The principal question which worried the contract 
purchasers was what effect this action would have both 
on Judge Will and on the lawsuit pending in the federal 
court. A related question was what effect a court order 
to resume making payments would have. The answer 
came on June 17, 1969, when one of the sellers reported 
to Judge Will that a purchaser had failed to make any 
payments for two years. The seller was asking that Judge 
Will order the contract purchaser to make the payments. 
Judge Will's response was that he had not ordered any 
contract purchasers to make payments and that he did 
not have the authority to do so. But he pointed out that 
the defendant had a right to bring an action in the state 
court under the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act. It be-
came clear to the members of the Contract Buyers 
League that their withholding action would not consti-
tute contempt of court and that Judge Will's reaction 
would be to tell the defendants that they had their own 
remedy in the state courts. 
The problem of providing immediate relief for con-
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tract purchasers who needed it could be solved only if 
the amounts to be deposited in the Contract Buyers 
League Holdout Fund were less than the monthly pay-
ments called for by the contract. Therefore, the mem-
bers of the Contract Buyers League decided that each 
individual contract purchaser would have to decide 
whether he would deposit the full monthly payment 
called for by the contract or an amount equal to 25% of 
the take-home pay of the principal wage earner in the 
family (plus the amount received from the rental if the 
property had units available for rental). The members of 
the Contract Buyers League were aware that it would be 
to their advantage to have the largest amount possible 
held on deposit at the time that the contracts are finally 
renegotiated. But the 25% figure would allow many 
families to start living a more normal, more human life. 
The members of the Contract Buyers League firmly 
believed that the withholding of payments would cause 
many of the defendants to resume talking about settle-
ment. The contract sellers had immediately begun to 
talk about settlement when the members of the Contract 
Buyers League first withheld their payments, and the 
sellers' willingness to talk virtually ended once the con-
tract purchasers had resumed making their monthly pay-
ments in April 1969. 
While the new withholding action was primarily 
designed to afford immediate relief and to lead to the 
resumption of settlement discussions, it was also 
designed to attack the constitutional problems of the un-
equal remedies under the Forcible Entry and Detainer 
Act. The League's goal was to have that act declared un-
constitutional, or to have the courts determine that the 
law was being misapplied when it denied the contract 
buyer the right to raise defenses in an eviction pro-
ceeding. This constitutional question came before the 
Circuit Court of Cook County in an action for a 
declaratory judgment on the constitutionality or applica-
tion of the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act 
brought by all threatened contract purchasers. Circuit 
Court Judge Edward Egan heard the arguments and 
refused to make a declaratory judgment on the grounds 
that the declaratory judgment sought involved an issue 
of law, not an issue of fact. He held that his power was 
limited to entering declaratory judgments on issues of 
fact. 
Legal remedies were clearly inadequate, but the Con-
tract Buyers League was determined to take every pre-
caution to prevent the eviction of families. Another pro-
vision of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act meant 
that a contract purchaser who wished to appeal a deci-
sion under the act had to post a bond to do so. The 
amount of the bonds, as determined by the trial court, 
usually consisted of the delinquency amount plus a 
year's payments, court costs and attorneys' fees. 
This was another failure of the judicial proce!ts. The 
contract buyers could not submit their problem to full 
legal scrutiny. They were not in a position either to raise 
defenses or to afford the high initial cost of the bond. In 
this situation, black people found themselves in the con-
tradictory position of being told by the white com-
munity that they should submit their problems to the 
judicial process and obtain justice through law and order, 
while at the same time being unable to afford the bonds 
which are necessary to do as the white community 
directs. The only way by which black contract pur-
chasers possibly could submit this problem to the . 
judicial process was if the appeal bonds were provided 
from outside their community. 
In view of the bonding problems just described, the 
Contract Buyers League decided in July 1969 that it 
would attempt to raise money for bonds in the white 
community. The CBL felt that this effort would enable 
the members of the white community in a position to do 
so to respond by submitting themselves to the same risks 
and uncertainties black people live with every day. It 
would be an opportunity for the white community to 
enable black contract purchasers to take advantage of 
their "right" to submit their problems to the full 
scrutiny of the judicial process. Of the $350,000 pledged 
to the Fund, $250,000 had been pledged by Jesuits 
across the country. Of this $250,000, the Chicago 
Province of the Society of Jesuits had pledged one fifth 
of their own useable assets-$ I 00,000. 
In announcing the Chicago Province pledge, the Very 
Reverend Robert F. Harvanek, S. J., provincial superior 
of the Chicago Province Jesuits, said: 
"We take this action because we believe both in the 
capacity of the American judicial system to rectify its 
legal procedures and because we believe in the funda-
mental and basic justice of the decision to withhold pay-
ments pending final solution of the case by the courts. 
If we were to lose this money, it would cause a serious 
hardship to us because the money is needed to train our 
men." 
If the litigation were successful, the money would be 
returned to the contributors; if unsuccessful, the funds 
would be used to pay off the judgment so that the funds 
which the contract buyers had with11eld and deposited in 
escrow could be used for getting a new start. 
Between July and December, $350,000 was pledged 
to the Guarantee Bond Fund. Since this was not nearly 
enough to cover the individual bonds set by the courts in 
the Forcible Entry and Detainer cases during that time, 
the members of the Contract Buyers League voted that 
no bonds should be posted unless there was sufficient 
money pledged to post individual bonds for all contract 
buyers faced with eviction as a result of the withholding 
of payments. 
In January 1970 the attorneys representing the Con-
tract Buyers League proposed that all the appeals of 
eviction cases should be consolidated and offered to the 
Supreme Court of Illinois with a bond in the amount 
pledged to the Guarantee Bond Fund. The Supreme 
Court of Illinois refused thi.s offer. With this develop-
ment, it was clear that bond funds were no longer 
needed and the money which had been pledged was 
released. 
Shortly after the members of the Contract Buyers 
League began withholding payments for the second time, 
the sellers began to press for evictions. The first cases 
came to trial in late August. By the end of September, 
the sellers had instituted eviction proceedings against 
261 of the 552 families who were withholding. Each 
day, the dockets of the Circuit Court of Cook County 
were filled with contract buyer cases. Each day, the 
judges entered orders against the contract buyers and 
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granted the families an average of thirty days to vacate 
their homes. Each day the judges demanded that the 
contract buyers advance two years' payments (approxi-
mately $5 ,000 per family) if they wished to appeal the 
decisions. 
Because of the large number of cases it was necessary 
to enlist the services of four additional law firms to assist 
contract buyers in dealing with the injustices of the 
eviction law; these were Patner & Karaganis, Mayer, 
Brown & Platt, McDermott, Will & Emery, and Leib-
man, Williams, Bennett, Baird & Minow. Though the 
attorneys were unsuccessful in persuading the judges to 
allow the contract buyers to raise defenses to set more 
reasonable appeal bonds, they did obtain extensions in 
the time that contract buyers would have before vacating 
their homes. As a result, the first date on which a with-
holding contract buyer could be evicted was Tuesday, 
October 7, 1969. 
As the date of the first evictions approached, the 
people of the Contract Buyers League decided to drama-
tize the plight of the contract buyers. They made plans 
to have a group assemble outside the office of Chief 
Judge John Boyle at 9 A.M. on Monday, October 6. 
Approximately 400 contract buyers were present and 
Judge Boyle met with a delegation for over an hour. 
During the course of the conference, the League pre-
sented Judge Boyle with a memorandum addressed to all 
the judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County outlining 
their problem. The memorandum concluded with the 
following paragraphs: 
"Every day this past week, you Judges of the Circuit 
Court of Cook County have ruled against us. We are 
losing unjustly. You have not only ruled that we must be 
evicted and lose everything we have paid in on our 
homes, but you have made it impossible for us to appeal 
your decisions because you have set appeal bonds so 
high-for example, a family with a $600 delinquency 
must post $7 ,500 in order to be able to take advantage 
of full judicial review of their case. One of your judges 
has been raising the amount of the bond each day. It is 
clear that the law has joined the ranks of the real estate 
men in oppressing us. Following the procedure you have 
set this past week, 552 black families from the Contract 
Buyers League will be set out in the streets before 
Christmas. 
"In the interest of justice and in the interest of saving 
what is good in the judicial process, we are here today to 
ask that all evictions be stopped and that you apply the 
law in such a way so that both sides can present their 
whole story." 
As the members of the Contract Buyers League 
approached Judge Boyle on this October morning, their 
position was strengthened both by the orderliness of the 
crowd-they had their own marshals to keep open aisles 
in the Civic Center hallways-and by an outstanding lead 
editorial in that morning's edition of the Chicago Sun-
Times. The editorial, entitled "Justice for Black Home-
buyers" read in part: 
"These are not ordinary eviction cases. The 261 
families are not indigent; they have elected to withhold 
monthly payments on home purchase contracts because 
the constitutionality of the contracts is being tested in a 
nationally important case in the federal court. Some 
4,000 black families are party to the suit. They charge 
that some 50 white speculators in homes grievously over-
charged them because of their race, sometimes double 
fair market value. The case originated with families from 
the West Side Lawndale area but it is now a class action 
that could affect every home sold on a discriminatory 
contract. 
"Home-buyers seeking a redress of fundamental 
grievances should not be penalized by the slowness of 
the legal machinery. Local courts should be as much 
concerned about home-buyers' rights as speculators' 
rights. Why should home-buyers put up an appeal bond 
as well as putting their payments in escrow? 
"We hope Judge Boyle can provide a Solomonesque 
ruling that goes beyond the narrow limits of the current 
eviction law." 
There was an immediate stay of all evictions for 
twenty days, which was followed by further court-
ordered delays. As a result of these stays and of negotia-
tions carried on with the office of Cook County Sheriff 
Joseph I. Woods, there were assurances by the end of 
November that no evictions would be carried out before 
January 5, 1970. 
But in spite of these assurances, the sheriff's deputies 
staged a surprise attack on Thursday, December 11, and 
evicted Miss Elizabeth Nelson from the home where she 
lived with her deceased. sister's nine children. The 
deputies arrived while Miss Nelson was at work and 
completed their work within a few hours. However, 
several members of the Contract Buyers League and 
neighbors immediately moved her belongings back into 
the home. 
In October, November and December motions were 
made before Judge Will asking him to enjoin the 
evictions during the pendency of the Contract Buyers 
League litigation. Judge Will indicated that he would be 
willing to enjoin eviction in "hardship cases" but did not 
classify as hardship cases those contracts calling for 
monthly payments amounting to 35% to 45% of a 
family's monthly income, even though such contrao:ts 
required husbands and wives to take extra jobs. Every 
attempt to persuade Judge Will to act proved futile. Fre-
quently his courtroom oratory and demeanor led con-
tract buyers to believe that he was approaching the issue 
with a closed mind. He even appeared to be mistaking 
the Contract Buyers League complaints about the slow-
ness and inadequacies of the judicial process as personal 
attacks on his manner of handling the cases before him. 
In December the attorneys for the contract buyers 
presented a motion in the federal court in which they 
asked that a special three-judge panel be convened in 
order to rule on the question of the constitutionality or 
application of the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer 
Act. The three-judge panel was convened but decided 
not to rule on the question because they claimed their 
jurisdiction was unclear. They asked the lawyers for 
further briefing on the jurisdictional question. 
The Contract Buyers League, independently of their 
attorneys, distributed a special memorandum to the 
three-judge panel, the lawyers and the press. The 
attorneys for the Contract Buyers League were dis-
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tressed by this memorandum because they felt that they 
were being criticized. 
The significance of the memorandum was not that it 
had any effect on the court but that it did spell out for 
CBL supporters and others a number of the difficulties 
which faced the contract buyers. This memorandum 
read, in part as follows: 
"For some time, people have been telling black 
people that they should seek redress for their grievances 
by going through the courts. Our experience over the 
last year is such that we are beginning to believe that it is 
impossible for black people to get justice through the 
judicial system. For us, things get worse when we try to 
get "justice" in the courts .... 
"We have full confidence in the lawyers who are 
representing us, and we are appreciative of the enormous 
contribution that they have made by contributing talent 
and man-hours. Nevertheless, we are aware that their 
resources are limited and that they cannot devote more 
time than they are doing to the completion of the dis-
covery process. Because we do not have money, we can-
not hire the additional lawyers which would be neces-
sary in order to get to trial more quickly. This aspect of 
the judicial system alone is working to our disadvantage 
and making it difficult for us to get justice in the courts. 
"The second aspect of the system includes the 
lawyers who are representing the defendants. Their hard-
nosed tactics and their use of all 'the clubs' provided by 
law for the buyers are working against us. In addition, 
their insistence in bringing up a multitude of issues 
which are not directly related to the main issue of the 
suits that we have brought is a factor which delays again 
and again a speedy resolution of the main issue of our 
cases. 
"The third element of the judicial system which is 
working against us is the legal framework within which 
we are operating. We do not understand how it can be 
said that the law protects everyone. We have a complaint 
against the contract sellers in that they overcharged us 
for our homes. They have a complaint against us because 
we have not been making payments since July 1. For our 
complaint, the only way we can get justice through the 
courts is by going through a long, drawn out, uncertain 
legal battle which will last until at least 1973. The kind 
of proof that is demanded of us is so extensive and 
complicated that it goes far beyond what reasonable 
people would demand in order to prove an injustice. The 
sellers can get a remedy for their complaint in a matter 
of a few weeks, evicting us from our homes and taking 
all the money we have paid in thus far. This may be the 
law but it is certainly not justice. We do not have equal 
protection under the law and people like the Collins 
family cannot raise the defense of an unjust price. 
"In order for us to appeal the decisions of the state 
court judges ordering us to be evicted from our homes, it 
is necessary for us to post outrageously high bonds .... 
"From what we have said so far, it should be clear 
that we see that the law is oppressing us for three 
reasons: 
"l. The only remedy for our complaint is a long, 
drawn out, complicated legal battle 
"2. The Forcible Entry and Detainer Act robs us of 
our constitutional rights 
"3. The bonds required make it impossible for us to 
get justice in a way that we could if we were rich people. 
"The fourth aspect of the judicial system which 
works against us black people is the fact that the judges 
who rule in our cases are limited human beings. None of 
the judges who hear our cases is familiar with the experi-
ence of living in the neighborhoods we live in and the 
pressures we live under. Some judges talk in such a way 
that we get the impression that they are unwilling to 
grant us relief because of hurt pride or some other 
similar reason. For example, one state court judge said 
that he was not concerned about social problems. Justice 
for most of the judges before whom we appear seems to 
be an ivory tower matter completely divorced from 
human reality. What we are saying is that it appears to us 
that the judges who hear our cases approach the matter 
with a pre-fixed frame of mind which makes it impos-
sible for us to get justice .... " 
The failure of the various legal attempts to resolve the 
problems presented by the eviction law left members of 
the Contract Buyers League discouraged, but deter-
mined. They were discouraged because each of the 
judges seemed to be attempting to "wash his hands" of 
the matter in Pontius Pilate fashion. Judge Egan had 
backed away from the issue by questioning his power to 
decide it. The state court judges in the individual evic-
tion cases all claimed that their hands were tied. Judge 
Will kept insisting that the buyers had their remedy in 
the state courts. And the three-judge panel had ques-
tioned its jurisdiction and avoided timely decision by 
asking for further work on the jurisdictional question. 
Nevertheless, the contract buyers were determined 
that they were not going to allow the apparent insuf-
ficiency of court remedies to stop them. They were 
determined to remain nonviolent. And now they were 
determined to outsmart the sheriff when he came to 
evict them once the moratorium on evictions ended in 
early January. 
Plans were made for meeting the sheriff on Monday, 
January 5, 1970. Several hundred CBL members and 
supporters met at various locations in the threatened 
area on the South Side. Word came around noon that 
the sheriffs men were proceeding to the home of Leon 
Harper. The CBL strategy was to have so many people in 
and around the home that it would be impossible for the 
movers to do their work. About 25 deputies arrived at 
1 P.M., briefly surveyed the situation and cfeparted. 
Within a half hour, the CBL communication system 
reported that the sheriff's deputies had proceeded to the 
home of Joseph Gibson, four miles away. The CBL 
group then rushed to the Gibson home where they 
found a few pieces of furniture had already been moved 
outside into the twelve degree weather. Moments later, 
however, the CBL supporters, following the lead of Mr. 
Gibson, entered the home, replaced the furniture and 
evicted the sheriffs men. For the next two hours, the 
frustrated deputies and city police conferred on a plan 
of action. In spite of the vigorous determination of the 
CBL group, everything had happened quickly and with-
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out violence. It was not an ordinary situation of con-
frontation. The law men finally adopted what the 
Chicago Daily News called a "strategic retreat." But the 
sheriffs men vowed to return with more men. 
The next three and a half weeks saw no evictions and 
tireless efforts by CBL lawyers to obtain an injunction 
against further evictions. CBL attorney Thomas P. 
Sullivan approached the Supreme Court of Illinois re-
questing consolidation of all the cases. Twice the Con-
tract Buyers League offered to pay the mortgage, tax, 
insurance and overhead expenses of the contract sellers 
and deposit the remainder of the monthly payments 
with the Clerk of the Court. The League also proposed 
posting a $250,000 bond. The Supreme Court turned 
down all these offers but did agree to an accelerated 
briefing schedule and decided to hear arguments on the 
question of the constitutionality of the Forcible Entry 
and Detainer Act on March 10th. 
In spite of all these efforts, however, the eviction 
threat became reality on Thursday, 1 anuary 29, at the 
home of Johnnie and Doris Moss. Early in the morning, 
Sheriff Joseph Woods assembled a force of some 200 
deputies and movers at the 12th Street beach where they 
received instructions and checked out their equipment, 
including gas masks and truncheons. Accompanied by a 
large contingent of city police, they then proceeded by 
buses to the Moss home at 8539 South Prairie. Mr. and 
Mrs. Moss were both at work when the Sheriff arrived. 
The three Moss foster children refused to open the door. 
The Sheriffs squad picked the lock and cut the tele-
phone lines. Keith, the oldest son, rushed to a neighbor's 
phone to alert CBL headquarters and to call his father. 
CBL members, supporters and newsmen soon arrived to 
find the Moss property cordoned off by lines of trun-
cheon-carrying, helmeted deputies, and piles of furniture 
in the front yard. 
tletore the three-hour eviction process ended, a force 
of 16 private security guards hired by Universal Builders 
installed themselves in the Moss home. As the deputies 
departed, the angry CBL on-lookers surged to the front 
of the house, determined to evict the guards and re-
instate the Moss family. Windows were broken and 
boarding battered down. During the confusion, three 
pistol shots fir_ed by security guards were .hel!rd coming 
from inside the house. Joe Gibson, a CBL member, 
calmed the crowd and reassured the security guards that 
no harm was intended them. The guards soon agreed to 
vacate the house and were greeted by cheers as they 
walked out the front door, leaving the house to CBL. 
An enthusi~tic group put all the furniture and be-
longings back into the house in about thirty minutes. A 
collection was taken up for the Moss family, a glazer was 
called to replace broken windows and a work crew re-
mained at the house the entire day to help straighten out 
the home. 
Immediately after the Moss eviction, Sheriff Woods 
announced that he would never again send a 200 man 
army and spend $25 ,000 of the taxpayers' money on an 
eviction which would be effective for only thirty 
minutes. He also stated that all evictions would halt 
until the courts took action against the families who had 
been reinstated by CBL after the evictions. The response 
of the contract sellers to the sheriffs statements was the 
filing of a $7 ,000,000 damage suit charging him with 
failure to discharge his reponsibilities. 
Evictions were, nevertheless, halted until mid-March. 
The arguments on the constitutionality of the Forcible 
Entry and Detainer Act were heard before the Supreme 
Court of Illinois on March 10th. Despite the matter 
pending before the Supreme Court, the evictions began 
again in the last two weeks of March. Five attempts were 
thwarted by CBL efforts. On Monday, Tuesday and 
Wednesday, March 30, 31 and April 1, CBL suffered 
serious setbacks when the first twenty-one families were 
evicted. In a carefully contrived plan, the sheriff and the 
city police cordoned off an entire block at a time and 
proceeded to evict all the CBL withholders in that block 
at the same time. Security guards and special police re-
mained on guard on a 24-hour basis. 
After the eviction of 21 families from their new 
homes on the South Side, CBL decided that a new 
strategy was needed. On Monday, April 6, 500 CBL 
members and supporters met outside Mayor Daley's 
office to appeal for a halt in the evictions. The Mayor 
agreed to intervene and talks between CBL leaders and 
lawyers and the officers and lawyers of the principal 
South Side builder proceeded during the next two days. 
An agreement was formulated on April 9 which relieved 
the pressure of evictions on the many CBL families who 
went along with the agreement. 
Under the terms of the agreement, the conract buyers 
of new homes who were withholding payments would 
relinquish the money withheld and resume regular pay-
ments. The builder would post a substantial cash bond, 
halt the evictions, reinstate the contracts and permit 
evicted families to return to their homes. In addition, 
Police Commissioner James Conlisk subsequently 
announced that the city police would no longer partici-
pate in evictions. 
Up to this time, all eviction attempts on the South 
Side involved purchasers of new homes. In April, several 
evictions were attempted on the West Side involving con-
tract purchasers of old homes, including Charlie Baker, 
CBL chairman. In each of these cases, the families were 
promptly moved back in by CBL members and sup-
porters. Criminal trespass charges were brought against 
the evicted families. 
As this issue goes to press (May 1971), only one 
trespass case has gone to court; in that case, the contract 
buyers were found not guilty. 
The eviction of families in old homes stopped when 
Judge Will, indicated that he w~uld dismiss withholders 
from the federal lawsuit if they continued withholding. 
CBL members began seriously considering halting their 
payment strike. CBL families were faced with the choice 
of keeping the approximately $2,000 which each of 
them had withheld thus far and being dismissed from the 
lawsuit or resuming their payments under a plan where-
by some of the money paid in would be withheld from 
the sellers under court order. The latter choice would 
stake their holdings on the possibility of the judicial 
process working in their favor to save them approxi-
mately $8,000 to $10,000 per family. With surprising 
unanimity, the CBL families chose the latter. They indi-
cated that they would prefer to take their chances on 
working within the legal system because the potential 13
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savings were greater and the results would benefit 
people similarly situated throughout the country. 
On the legal side, CBL has won two legal victories. 
The first occurred on April 15, 1970, when the Supreme 
Court of Illinois, in a landmark decision, reinterpreted 
the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute and held that a 
buyer may defend against eviction and forfeiture of his 
purchase payments by showing he was defrauded. While 
this victory was significant because of its far-reaching 
implications, it did not have immediate practical results 
for the contract buyers who were withholding payments 
because the Court had decided only one of the two con-
stitutional issues presented. The Court had not decided 
the question of the statute's bonding provisions. Re-
argument on the appeal bond issue is to be made before 
the Court in May 1971. 
The other victory was a favorable ruling by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in October 1970, which allowed 85% of 
the 3,500 CBL plaintiffs in the two suits to retain their 
status as plaintiffs. The Supreme Court upheld the 
rulings of Judge Will and the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals which stated that the Statute of Limitations 
could not be so applied as to bar plaintiffs who had 
made payments after January 6, 1964. 
Other Developments 
After the Contract Buyers League and the principal 
builders of new homes on the South Side reached an 
agreement in Mayor Daley's office on April 9, approxi-
mately 30 South Side families purchasing new homes 
expressed dissatisfaction with the settlement and with 
the CBL leadership and decided to continue the pay-
ment strike and to operate independently of the main 
CBL organization. This group has subsequently suffered 
further evictions and various other difficulties. 
In addition, members of this group attempted to 
interfere with the discovery work being conducted by 
the CBL lawyers in connection with the new property 
case. Nine members of the splinter group filed a 
$10,000,000 lawsuit on August 25, 1970, against the 
Contract Buyers League leadership, lawyers, supporters 
and advisers as well as John Cardinal Cody, the Roman 
Catholic archbishop of Chicago (who never supported 
CBL). The complaint refered to a warranty deed exe-
cuted by the Catholic Bishop of Chicago conveying 
certain South Side property to an affiliate of the princi-
pal builder involved in the contract sales of new homes 
on the South Side. The complaint alleges that the 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago retained a beneficial interest 
in these properties. It further alleges that the CBL 
lawyers, supporters and advisers were acting to protect 
the interest of the Catholic Bishop of Chicago when they 
urged the contract purchasers of new homes to resume 
monthly payments in accordance with the agreement 
over which Mayor Daley presided. The CBL filed their 
answers to this suit, but to date no further action has 
been taken. 
At a regular Wednesday meeting of the Contract 
Buyers League on August 26, 1970, the people of CBL 
expressed the unanimous opinion that it was most un-
fortunate that the splinter group had separated itself 
from the Contract Buyers League and had allowed its 
dissatisfaction to reach such proportions. It was felt that 
the activity was not only detrimental to the achieve 
of the overall goals of the Contract Buyers League but 
also confused CBL supporters and friends because of the 
publicity surrounding the activities of the splinter group. 
At the same time, however, the people ofCBL unani-
mously decided that any attempt to retaliate with 
respect to the splinter group's interference or the allega-
tions of their lawsuit would be unwise. The splinter 
group continues to exist today on a limited basis. 
Achievements, Support and Endorsements 
The experience of the Contract Buyers League has 
demonstrated to its members that initiative, careful 
planning and hard work could bring them a long way. 
As of September 15, 1970, approximately 100 contracts 
had been renegotiated out of court saving the families 
involved nearly $1,000,000. 
In addition to the already noted successes in having 
the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act reinterpreted and 
establishing a Guarantee Bond Fund, a number of other 
achievements are noteworthy. Before the Contract 
Buyers League secured the assistance of the outstanding 
law firms mentioned above, a group of fifty lawyers 
volunteered their services and helped with some of the 
complicated legal aspects of renegotiation prior to the 
inception of the civil rights lawsuits. The financial com-
munity, including several of the major banks in Chicago, 
joined to provide mortgage money at reasonable interest 
rates for those who successfully renegotiated their con-
tracts. A group of businessmen is providing some 
financial aid, administrative services and expertise. A 
large number of civic and religious groups have helped in 
various forms, particularly by providing volunteers to 
work in the Contract Buyers League office. The groups 
have helped further by sending members to join in the 
picket lines with the contract purchasers. 
A prominent endorsement came in the form of a 
"amicus curiae" brief filed by the Attorney General of 
the United States in March 1969. The brief supporting 
the Contract Buyers League marked the first time in the 
history of our country that the Department of Justice 
intervened in a lawsuit at the trial level. Subsequently, 
the Justice Department filed another "amicus" brief 
supporting the contract buyers in the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals. In addition, the Justice Department 
claims that it has initiated projects to attack the prob-
lems suffered by contract purchasers in several other 
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